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FDA REFORM AND THE EUROPEAN MEDICINES 
EVALUATION AGENCY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The political change that swept through Washington in November 
1994 has intensified an already contentious debate about the appropri-
ate role of the federal government in regulating health and safety 
risks. The new Republican Congress has sought to challenge tradi-
tional patterns of administrative activity. 1 Not surprisingly, the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), with its sweeping regulatory author-
ity over products accounting for 25 cents of every consumer dollar -
over $r trillion annually2 - has been one prominent target of con-
servative critics bent on deregulating America. House Speaker Newt 
Gingrich has called FDA Commissioner David Kessler a "thug and a 
bully" and supports efforts to relegate the FDA to the role of an over-
sight agency, with more intensive testing and certification done by pri-
vate groups.3 Conservative organizations have aggressively accused 
the FDA of contributing directly to the deaths of patients who are left 
without lifesaving new drugs. 4 In response to this furor, the Clinton 
administration has proposed its own, less drastic suggestions for 
reform.5 
Although related to the general political climate in Washington, re-
form of the FDA's drug approval process differs from typical "con-
servative" deregulation in important ways, because both the health 
risks and therapeutic benefits of prescription drugs are internalized by 
individual patients. Many federal agencies charged with regulating 
risk, like the Environmental Protection Agency, must weigh potential 
economic benefits accruing to particular sectors of society against gen-
eralized risk to healthy populations. The conflict is often framed as 
one between "the public" and the regulated industries. Prescription 
drugs, on the other hand, involve discrete amounts of risk and benefit 
1 Most notably in the short term, the Republicans have drafted a "rulemaking moratorium" 
bill, which would void hundreds of agency regulations promulgated since November 30, 1994 . 
See Guy Gugliotta, Ambiguity Rules the Day: GOP Move to Limit Regulations Yields Maze of 
Interpretations, WASH. PosT, Feb. 23, 1995, at A25. 
2 See Henry I. Miller, The FDA and Regulatory Reform, S.F. CHRON., Mar. ro , 1995, at A23. 
3 Laurie McGinley, GOP Takes Aim at FDA, Seeking to Ease Way for Approval of New 
Drugs, Medical Products, WALL ST.]., Dec. 12, 1994, at Ar6. 
4 As one critic asks somewhat hyperbolically, "If a drug that has just been approved by FDA 
will start saving lives tomorrow, then how many people died yesterday waiting for the agency to 
act?" Sam Kazman, Deadly Overcaution: FDA's Drug Approval Process, r ]. REG. & Soc. CosTS 
35, 35 (1990). 
5 The proposed changes include an allowance made for manufacturers to change the way 
they produce approved drugs without receiving FDA preclearance, elimination of required envi-
ronmental assessments, removal of special requirements for insulin and antibiotic drugs, and other 
reforms. See BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, REINVENTING MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATIONS passim 
(1995). 
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that are assumed by individual patients.6 A tradeoff exists between 
the potential therapeutic gains from a new drug and the likelihood of 
an adverse reaction to that drug. The uncertain and contingent nature 
of illness and disease means that members of the public at large, as 
well as the FDA itself, have a difficult time striking this balance . 
Moreover, the very meaning of "risk" with respect to diseased pa-
tients differs from similar assessments of safety risk to healthy popula-
tions , with consequent difficulties for any agency charged with 
defining an appropriate level of safety. 7 How does one determine ac-
ceptable amounts of "risk" for a terminally ill AIDS or cancer patient? 
Even individuals in identical states of disease or illness may make 
widely differing decisions in the face of similar treatment risks. 8 
These unique features of drug regulation have produced unusual 
political coalitions to push for reform of the FDA's drug approval pro-
cess. Joining conservative critics of regulation are patients' groups 
(particularly for people with certain prominent diseases like cancer and 
AIDS), which have frequently decried the FDA's reluctance to grant 
swift approval to promising new drugs. 9 Similarly, physicians and, in-
creasingly, managed-care insurers are often in tension with the FDA 
over who is best placed to make particularized judgments about a 
drug's safety and effectiveness. Although the FDA rigorously scruti-
nizes all new drugs before approval, the agency allows doctors wide 
latitude to prescribe drugs approved for one particular use m unap-
proved ("unlabeled") ways to treat other conditions. 10 
Because prescription drug injuries are often so conspicuous, 
whereas the adverse health effects of nonapproval are frequently invis-
ible, the FDA's incentive structure naturally tends toward caution. An 
FDA employee working on a New Drug Application (NDA) has every 
reason to fear the death or severe injury that could follow from an ill-
advised drug approval. Conversely, the lack of concrete, identifiable 
6 One exception to this paradigm is the field of vaccines for contagious diseases, which have 
public health dimensions beyond the individual patient. 
7 In a rare judicial discussion of this quandary, the Tenth Circuit held that the Food, Drug & 
Cosmetic Act 's standards for new drug approval had no application to terminally ill cancer pa-
tients. See Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234, 1237 (roth Cir. 1978). The Supreme 
Court unanimously reversed, holding that "no exception for terminal patients may be judicially 
implied." United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 559 (19 79). 
8 In addition to different levels of risk aversion with respect to new drugs, patients might 
have widely different attitudes about the pain and suffering caused by existing therapies. 
9 See, e.g., Gina Kalata, An Angry Response to Actions on AIDS Spurs F. D. A. Shift, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26 , 1988, at r, 22. 
IO This policy is codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312.2(d) (1994). Some estimates find that up to so% 
of all current prescription drug therapies involve unapproved use of approved drugs. See Stephen 
Chapman, Th e FDA and Other Enemies of Public H ealth, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26 , 1995, § 4, at 3· 
Chapman and other critics of the FDA assert that if the dire health consequences that defenders 
of the current system predict upon deregulation were legitimate, they would be already apparent 
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InJury often makes the likely ramifications of an erroneous non-ap-
proval scant, if not non-existent. 
This cautious attitude is replicated in the agency's relationship 
with Congress. Members of Congress, concerned with public opinion, 
often hesitate to advocate approvals of specific new drugs which might 
subsequently produce well-documented adverse effects on consumers. 11 
On the other hand, the detrimental health effects of non-approval 
often are difficult to quantify and fail to galvanize public opinion. 
Proponents of strict drug regulation quite adeptly use the tragic and 
publicized nature of many drug injuries to sway Congress toward tight 
oversight of FDA drug approvals. 12 
This Note will briefly examine the FDA's current approval process 
for new drugs, some of its problems, and some recent suggestions for 
reform . The Note will argue that complete deregulation of 
pharmaceuticals is too severe, at least with respect to judgments of 
new drug safety. Instead, Congress and the FDA should take advan-
tage of a new opportunity for international cooperation presented by 
the European Community's recent establishment of a centralized drug 
regulatory body, the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA). 
By exploring opportunities for regulatory harmonization and mutual 
recognition of new drugs with this new superagency, the FDA could 
potentially speed access to new drugs while continuing to ensure pub-
lic safety. 
Part II below sets forth the broad outlines of the FDA's regulatory 
scheme for new drugs and lists some problems with the current re-
gime. Part III examines some FDA reform proposals currently on the 
public agenda. Part IV then explores the option of a mutual recogni-
tion scheme with the new EMEA, and Part V assesses some potential 
difficulties with that approach. A brief conclusion follows. 
II. FDA REGULATION AND ITS PROBLEMS 
The development of a new drug, from laboratory inception to final 
FDA approval, is a long and costly process. After completing years of 
carefully controlled and regulated clinical trials, drug manufacturers 
submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA for review. 13 
ll For example, Rep. Joe Barton (R-Texas), chair of a House Commerce subcommittee that 
oversees the FDA, has expressed this sentiment: "The FDA may be unique [because its decisions 
may have] life or death consequences. . . . If they were to approve a defective drug, it could kill 
people. Other regulatory agencies don ' t have as immediate a negative impact." Doug Levy, Prod-
ding the FDA: Both Sides Say Lives Are at Stake, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 1995, at rD. 
12 See C. Frederick Beckner, III, Note, The FDA's War on Drugs, 82 GEo. L.J. 529, 548-49 
(1993). Drug manufacturers, who would ordinarily exert strong interest group pressure on the 
FDA, face a collective action problem because each company already in the market benefits from 
the high barriers to new entry imposed by the FDA's regulatory process. See id. at 549· 
IJ Subject to a few exceptions, pharmaceuticals that are lawfully sold in the United States 
today fall into one of two categories: drugs that were generally recognized as safe and effective 
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Since r 962 , the FDA has administered a pre-marketing approval sys-
tem, whereby new therapeutic compounds must satisfy certain statu-
tory criteria for safety and effectiveness and must receive explicit 
agency approval before going on the market. 
The pre-1962 system differed from the current one in two impor-
tant ways . First, new drugs did not require explicit FDA approval to 
go on the market; mere agency silence for a certain amount of time 
after the NDA filing was sufficient.l 4 Second, prior to 1962 the FDA 
assessed only the safety of new drugs, not their effectiveness. 15 
Like other episodes of drug legislation, the Drug Amendments of 
1962 were enacted in the wake of a public health tragedy. In 1960 Dr. 
Frances Kelsey, an FDA examiner, delayed the approval of an NDA 
for the drug thalidomide due to a lack of sufficient safety informa-
tion.16 In 1961 doctors in Europe discovered that thalidomide, which 
was marketed there, was responsible for a significant number of birth 
defects. 17 The news helped to generate public support for the drug 
reform legislation that was already pending in the U.S. Senate. 18 
Under the current regime, a new drug must satisfy statutory stan-
dards of both safety and effectiveness to receive FDA approval. Sec-
tion sos(d) of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA) requires that to 
be approved, a drug must be shown "by all methods reasonably appli-
cable" to be "safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recom-
mended, or suggested in the proposed labeling."19 The same statutory 
section also requires "substantial evidence" that the drug is effective in 
its intended use. 20 Based on these standards and the evidence con-
tained in each NDA, the FDA makes a decision on each drug applica-
tion. The agency is not required to explain its reasons for approval or 
denial, and it may require certain post-approval research on the drug's 
effects. 21 
prior to the Drug Amendments of 1962 and drugs that have satisfied the FDA's NDA procedures. 
See ]AMES R. NiELSEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL DRUG LAW 27 (2d ed. 1992); see generally 
PETER B. HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 513-37 (2d ed. 1991) (describing 
the NDA application and approval process for new drugs). 
14 See Peter B. Hutt, The Regulation of Pharmaceutical Products in the USA, in PHARMA-
CEUTICAL MEDICINE 211, 216-17 (Denis M . Burley, Joan M. Clarke & Louis Lasagna eds., 2d ed. 
1994). 
15 See id. at 217 . 
!6 See PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
123 (1980). 
!7 See id. 
18 See id. at 124. 
19 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1988). 
20 See id. The statute defines "substantial evidence" of effectiveness as "evidence consisting of 
adequate and well-controlled investigations .. . that the drug will have the effect it purports or is 
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the 
labeling or proposed labeling thereof." /d. 
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The FDA's method of enforcing these standards of safety and ef-
fectiveness has garnered significant criticism of late. Gaining approval 
of an NDA can cost hundreds of millions of dollars and can take sev-
eral years. One estimate placed the 1987 average research, develop-
ment, and administrative costs of taking a new chemical compound 
through the full NDA process at $23 I million. 22 In the last year 
before NDA approval, the average "carrying cost" (of capital) amounts 
to approximately $3 I million. 23 
Much debate has centered on other, more indirect costs of drug 
regulation. Drug companies embark on the development of new com-
pounds in response to perceived demand from the medical community 
of doctors and patients. 24 During the decade-long research and ap-
proval process, numerous patients would presumably seek the thera-
peutic gains from a new compound were it available on the market. 
The unavailability of a new drug caused by the FDA's approval stric-
tures may cause significant detriment to these patients. 
The exact magnitude of this therapeutic loss is uncertain. A 
landmark study in this regard, performed over 20 years ago by econo-
mist Sam Peltzman, identified a decline in new drug innovation in the 
United States and attributed that decline to the drug amendments of 
rg62 .25 For example, his research indicated that an average of 42 new 
chemical entities were marketed each year in the fifteen years prior to 
rg62, compared with only sixteen in the decade following amend-
ment.26 Based on price information about drugs that were currently 
on the market, Peltzman estimated the therapeutic loss due to FDA 
regulation at over $450 million per year. 27 
22 Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, Henry G. Grabowski & Louis Lasagna, Cost of 
Innovation in the Pharm!Ueutical Industry, ro J. HEALTH ECON. 107, 125-26 (1991). 
23 Hutt, supra note 14, at 240. Research suggests that the high capital expenditures required 
to comply with FDA regulatory requirements contribute to a decline in research and development 
investment below optimal levels. See, e.g., MEIR STATMAN, COMPETITION IN THE PHARMACEUTI· 
CAL INDUSTRY: THE DECLINING PROFITABILITY OF DRUG INNOVATION 61-62 (1983). 
24 To provide incentives for drug companies to develop and manufacture products for rare 
diseases that would otherwise produce insufficient patient demand to support drug development, 
Congress in 1983 enacted the Orphan Drug Act. See 2r U.S.C. § 36oaa~e (r988). These provi-
sions allow tax credits for money spent on clinical testing of drugs for a "rare disease or condi-
tion," defined as one that affects fewer than 2oo,ooo persons nationwide, or drugs that are 
expected to cost more than they will earn on the market. See 2r U.S.C . § 36obb(a)(2); 26 U.S.C . 
§ 28 (r988). Also, the Act provides manufacturers with seven years of post-approval market ex-
clusivity for any unpatentable orphan drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 36occ(a) (1988); HuTT & MERRILL, 
supra note r3, at 566. 
25 "[T]he amendments' proof of efficiency and clinical testing requirements impose costs on 
the drug development process which discourage new drug development." Regulation of Pharma-
ceutical Innovation, 1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on 
Small Business, 93d Cong., rst Sess. 9802, 9803-07 (1973) (statement of Sam Peltzman). 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
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Other, more recent studies suggest that regulatory delays may have 
a negative impact on patient life expectancy and quality of life . One 
advocate of deregulation asserts that while the FDA was considering 
the NDA for misoprostol, a drug used to treat gastric ulcers, 8,ooo to 
rs ,ooo patients died from that condition. 28 Pharmacologists William 
Wardell and Louis Lasagna found that the drug nitrazepam, which 
was approved in the United States five years after it had been ap-
proved in Britain, might have saved thousands of American lives in 
that five-year span. 29 The authors noted that "[i]ntroduction of a new 
drug that produced fatalities anywhere approaching this magnitude 
would be regarded as a major disaster, but the undoubted occurrence 
of deaths through failure to introduce a drug has so far gone 
unremarked."30 
Numerous cross-national analyses have indicated that the FDA's 
regulatory scheme is more cumbersome than that of other countries. 
The aforementioned I975 study by Wardell and Lasagna popularized 
the notion of the "drug lag" between Britain and the United States, 
meaning that identical new compounds took significantly longer to 
wend their way through the rigorous American process.31 The authors 
concluded that although the higher strictures of the FDA process may 
have resulted in incremental safety gains, these benefits were out-
weighed by the loss of therapeutic potential from not-yet-approved 
drugs. 32 More recent data indicates that Britain and other industrial-
ized nations may still have a significant lead on the United States in 
the assessment and approval of beneficial drugs. In r984 the median 
time in Britain for granting of a "new product license" was twelve 
months;3 3 the median time for the FDA's NDA process was 3r.r 
months. 34 
Some skepticism is appropriate in considering the above statistical 
evidence. For instance, a significant portion of the cost and time in-
volved in developing a new chemical compound and bringing it to 
market would be incurred by pharmaceutical manufacturers even in 
28 See Kazman, supra note 4, at 4 7-48. 
29 See WILLIAM M. WARDELL & LOUIS LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
72-73 (1975). 
30 !d. at 73· 
31 See id. at 77. 
32 See id. at ros. According to Wardell and Lasagna: In view of the clear benefits demon-
strable from some of the drugs introduced into Britain, it appears that the United States has lost 
more than it has gained from adopting a more conservative approach than did Britain in the 
post-thalidomide era. I d. 
33 See J.P. Griffin, Objectives and Achievements of Regulations in the U.K., in INTERNA-
TIONAL MEDICINES REGULATION: A FORWARD LOOK TO 1992, at 73, 87 tbl. 8.8 (Stuart R. 
Walker & John P. Griffin eds., 1989) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL MEDICINES). 
34 See ].R. Crout, Objectives and Achievements of Regulations in the USA, in INTERNA-
TIONAL MEDICINES, supra note 33, at I I 7, 130. 
1 
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the absence of any regulation at a1P5 Also, defenders of the current 
system assert that small but significant safety gains are realized from 
the FDA's current cautious approach. 36 However, on balance research 
does suggest that regulatory systems in other industrialized nations 
achieve a generaliy safe drug supply while avoiding some of the delay 
of the FDA process. 
The FDA has responded to the problems in its new drug approval 
system with varying degrees of success. Pressure from organized pa-
tient groups has led the agency to loosen restrictions and allow some 
patients to be treated with new drugs that are still in the investiga-
tional stageY Also, the FDA has sought to accelerate the approval 
process for promising new drugs for certain life-threatening diseases .38 
The FDA claims that such efforts have reduced approval times and 
shortened the drug lag. According to the agency, its median approval 
time for new drug applications fell from 26.7 months in 1993 to I9 
months in 1994.39 Furthermore, for new pharmaceuticals processed 
under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992,40 the median time 
was 13.5 months - and only 10-4 months for "therapeutically impor-
tant indications."4 1 
Some experts question the FDA's statistics and claim that the time 
for NDA approval is decreasing only because the FDA is asking for 
substantially more clinical data before it starts its NDA review 
"clock."42 The Center for the Study of Drug Development at Tufts 
University found that from 1990 to 1992, although median review time 
for "important" new drugs was 20 months instead of 3 r for other prod-
ucts, development times for the former group were three years 
longer.43 According to Dr. Louis Lasagna, head of the Center, the 
length between drug discovery and NDA approval "is not 
shortening."44 
35 For a description of the clinical testing process for new drugs, see H UTT & MERRILL, supra 
note 13, at 513-19. 
36 See infra p. 2023. 
37 See Hutt, supra note 14, at 230. The FDA allows such early treatment when, in addition 
to other factors , the drug is intended to treat a serious or immediately life-threatening disease and 
when there is no satisfactory alternative. See id. To supplement such "compassionate use" INDs, 
the FDA also permits "parallel track" procedures for AIDS when no therapeutic alternative exists 
and individuals cannot participate in individual clinical trials. !d. 
38 See Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human R esources, 104th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1995) (statement of David Kessler, FDA Commissioner) [hereinafter Kessler Testimony] . 
39 See id. 
40 Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 
1992)). 
41 See Kessler Testimony, supra note 38. 
42 See John Carey, Is the FDA Hooked on Caution?, Bus. WEEK, Jan 30, 1995, at 72, 73. 
43 See id. 
44 Chapman, supra note 10, at 3· 
2016 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. ro8:2009 
The FDA deserves credit for its attempts to respond to the con-
cerns of specific groups and to improve on aspects of the new drug 
approval process generally. Yet piecemeal reform efforts that maintain 
the current FDA structure carry certain limitations, many resulting 
from the particular regulatory history and environment of the agency. 
As described above, the incentives for caution that FDA investigators 
face may mean that internal reforms will meet with diminishing mar-
ginal returns. 
Ill. DEREGULATORY REFORMS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
The problems associated with the drug regulatory process have 
spurred a number of conservative thinkers to advocate a radical re-
structuring of the FDA's role . Not surprisingly, advocates for massive 
deregulation are emboldened by the current political climate in the na-
tion's capital. The unifying theme of many conservative proposals, 
whether they originate within or outside of Congress, is an almost 
complete elimination of the FDA's power to prevent a new drug from 
reaching the market. Advocates of deregulation propose reconfiguring 
the FDA as a mere certification agency, with the authority to grant or 
withhold its "stamp of approval" for a particular drug or medical de-
vice but not to proscribe sales altogether. 45 This agency construct 
would parallel the role of the Underwriters Laboratories and other pri-
vate groups, which assess and certify quality and safety standards for 
a wide range of electronic and mechanical consumer products. Ac-
cording to proponents, such a regulatory scheme would allow patients 
and their physicians to make informed decisions regarding drug con-
sumption - by using a drug that did not have FDA certification, a 
patient would accept the risks of safety problems or ineffectiveness. In 
some ways, such a dual system already exists, as the FDA does not 
prohibit individual patients from receiving unapproved drugs from 
abroad.46 
Related reform proposals urge a greater role for the medical profes-
sion in assessing the safety and efficacy of new drugs. For the major-
ity of this century, decisions about drug efficacy were left completely 
in the hands of prescribing physicians. Some commentators now feel 
that the changing structure of the health care industry makes a return 
to greater provider autonomy appropriate. William Wardell, long an 
authority in the field of drug regulation, has suggested that the growth 
of managed care medicine, in which health care providers bear the 
45 See Reginald Rhein, Congress, Health Care Groups Push for Faster FDA, Biotechnology 
Newswatch, Feb. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. 
46 Since 1977, the FDA has not detained unapproved new drugs imported for personal use. 
See Hutt, supra note 14, at 238. Given the high costs of many such imported drugs and the fact 
that they are often not covered by U.S. health insurance plans, access to unapproved imported 
drugs is often out of reach for less wealthy Americans. 
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financial risk of ineffective treatment, might result in a shift of the 
actual decisionmaking power about new drugs from the FDA to man-
aged care institutions.47 
The above proposals for reform, and like measures, share a com-
mon distrust of the FDA's ability to balance the risks and benefits of 
new drugs appropriately. Such proposals thus seek to shift the respon-
sibility of striking the balance to other groups - consumers, private 
boards, and health care providers - which purportedly can do it bet-
ter. None of these groups, however, possess sufficient incentives or 
information to supplant the FDA as a guarantor of a new drug's 
safety and efficacy. Managed care health organizations are concerned 
first and foremost with the cost-effectiveness of any new drug therapy, 
rather than with the safety and efficacy of a new drug, and therefore 
may not always act as "honest agents" for patients. Patients them-
selves, as consumers of new drugs, may lack sufficient information to 
assess adequately when to avoid a new drug that has not been "certi-
fied" by the FDA. Clinical assessments of drug performance are often 
complex and difficult to interpret, which could present problems of 
understanding for patients, even with the assistance of individual phy-
sicians. Finally (and ironically) the apparent success in this Congress 
of tort reform that would impose caps on nonpecuniary and punitive 
damages, undercuts a basic argument of critics of the FDA, many of 
whom also supported tort reform. Whereas before it could be argued 
that the tort system existed as a formidable independent check against 
unsafe drugs, the new caps on nonpecuniary damages, coupled with 
preexisting obstacles to proof of causation and damages in drug injury 
actions, cast doubt on whether tort law can effectively deter drug 
manufacturers from discounting safety.48 Some form of government 
regulatory oversight is needed to protect the public from unsafe drugs. 
The proposal that follows accepts the view that the current FDA 
structure may lead to the overregulation of beneficial new drugs. 
However, rather than advocating the complete removal of 
pharmaceuticals from the purview of government regulation, this pro-
posal explores ways in which collaboration and even "competition" 
with a counterpart government agency in Europe might render the 
FDA more responsive to popular demand for beneficial therapies 
while maintaining its role as a guarantor of safety. 
47 See William Wardell, Transcript of the Conference on Reforming the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration: The Pharmaceutical Approval Process 21-22 (Mar. 10, 1995) (transcript available in 
Harvard Law School Library); see also William R. Sage, Note, Drug Product Liability and Health 
Care Delivery Systems' 40 STAN. L. REV. 989, 992-98, 1005-08, 1011-14 (1988) (describing the 
growth of capitated managed care systems and discussing the implications for drug product 
liability). 
48 SWAT 
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IV. THE EMEA AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
The United States is not alone in grappling with the tradeoff be-
tween the risks and benefits of faster approval of new drugs. The 
European Community recently established a centralized agency in an 
effort to standardize and accelerate the approval process for certain 
new drugs. 4 9 The European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) 
will act both as a centralized approval agency, with its decisions bind-
ing on all member states, and as an oversight body for a more decen-
tralized mutual recognition procedure, whereby approval of a new 
drug by the authority of one member state will, absent cause, be suffi-
cient for approval in all other member states. 50 
Under the new EC and EMEA system, three types of new drug 
application procedures operate simultaneously. First, an applicant 
may submit information concerning a new drug for consideration by 
the EMEA itself.5 1 The EMEA is then supposed to return a ruling -
binding on the entire European Community - within 300 days. A 
second, more decentralized route allows companies to apply to one 
specific national drug regulatory agency and send a copy of the appli-
cation to other member states.52 If the drug application is approved 
by the first nation, other nations are required either to recognize the 
new drug for sale within their borders or to file a formal objection for 
adjudication by the EC. Finally, companies wishing to market a drug 
in only one member state are free to use traditional national applica-
tion procedures.s3 
This Section proposes two reforms of the FDA's new drug ap-
proval process in light of the creation of the EMEA. First is the mod-
est suggestion that approval of a new drug by the EMEA should 
constitute "substantial evidence" of a drug's efficacy sufficient to sat-
isfy Section 355(d) of the FDCA. Second is a more fundamental re-
form that would require the FDA to grant approval, within a specified 
statutory time period, of any new drug certified by the EMEA unless 
the FDA could show that the drug might be unsafe or ineffective. 
Both of these wggested reforms would require a degree of internation-
alization which to date has been notably absent at the FDA. But both 
changes offer hope for quicker access to beneficial drugs while avoid-
ing the grave safety risks posed by unrestrained deregulation. 
49 See Richard F. Kingham, Peter W.L. Bogaert & Pamela S. Eddy, The New European 
Medicines Agency, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 301, 301 (1994). 
50 See id. at 304-12. 
5! This centralized approval process is required for certain biotechnology products. See 
Pharmaceuticals: European Agency to Start Processing Application Forms Next January, Multina-
tional Service, May ro, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Mul-
tinational Service]. 
52 See Multinational Service, supra note s r. 
53 See id. During a transition period lasting through 1998, a company may also use national 
procedures for simultaneous applications to several different states. 
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A. EMEA Approval as "Substantial Evidence" of Efficacy 
The EMEA's approval of a new drug for sale throughout Europe 
should satisfy the FDCA 's substantial evidence standard for effective-
ness. Like the FDA, the EMEA requires proof of effectiveness and 
mandates high standards of research and scientific evidence that com-
port with the "adequate and well-controlled studies" language of Sec-
tion 355(d) of the FDCA. 
Legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend the 
FDCA 's efficacy requirement to be an insurmountable barrier for 
promising new drugs. Prior to the passage of the 1962 Amendments, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee debated the proper standard for drug 
efficacy. Some members proposed a "preponderant evidence" thresh-
old, while others advocated the lower "substantial evidence" stan-
dard.54 Under the former standard, a drug would not be recognized as 
effective "unless it represented the preponderant view of experts quali-
fied by training and experience in the subject that the claim was sup-
ported."55 However, the committee (and eventually both Houses of 
Congress) opted for the less stringent substantial evidence test. Recog-
nizing that "in the difficult area of drug testing and evaluation there 
will frequently, if not usually, be a difference of responsible opinion," 
the Senate Committee stated that "the existence of such a difference 
should not result in disapproval of a claim of effectiveness if it is sup-
ported by substantial evidence."56 
Whatever one's opinion regarding the weight the FDA should give 
to EMEA determinations on matters of safety, the European agency's 
efficacy determination should satisfy the FDCA's substantial evidence 
threshold. The similar requirements of clinical review and scientific 
rigor employed by the agencies suggest that an EMEA determination 
of a drug's effectiveness fits the FDCA's terms. Because the European 
standard includes a third requirement, "quality," it may even prove 
more rigorous than the American testY 
Finally, recent developments in the American health care industry 
may support a reduction of the emphasis on intense FDA scrutiny of 
new drug effectiveness. For most of the FDA's history, the agency 
was charged only with screening out unsafe drugs; determinations of 
efficacy in prescription drugs were left to prescribing physicians.58 
54 S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d. Sess., pt. 2 (1962), reprinted in 21 U.S.C.A. § 321 (1981). 
55 /d. (emphasis added). 
56 /d. 
57 See Eric M. Katz, Europe's Centralized New Drug Procedures: Is the United States Pre-
pared to Keep Pace?, 48 Fooo & DRUG L.J. 577, 585 (1993). 
58 See Hutt, supra note 14, at 217; TEMIN, supra note 16, at 127-28. To facilitate these deter-
minations by physicians and patients, the FDA imposed on drug producers a panoply of labeling 
and disclosure requirements, many of which remain in force today. See Hutt, supra note 14, at 
2J6. 
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However, Congress's 1962 amendments to the FDCA added an effi-
cacy review for drugs already on the market and all new drug applica-
tions. At that time, physicians were no longer thought to be effective 
agents for patients, because the individual prescribing physician did 
not bear the costs of expensive prescription drugs and typically lacked 
the expertise required to pass judgment on a range of prescription 
drugs. 59 
Today, in contrast, many physicians work for sophisticated man-
aged care organizations which do bear the costs of drug treatment. In 
such arrangements, the managed care provider accepts the burden of 
all treatment costs for patients in return for a fixed, or "capitated," 
annual fee. As a result, physicians in managed care plans have strong 
incentives not to prescribe ineffective drugs. 60 Although the incentive 
structure of managed care entities is such that independent FDA re-
view is still necessary for new drugs - particularly with respect to 
new drug safety - the fact that most Americans will be covered by 
capitated insurance plans should temper concern over widespread use 
of ineffective drugs. The FDA's reliance on EMEA approval of a new 
drug as "substantial evidence" of that drug's effectiveness would thus 
comport with the values underlying the statutory requirement of 
effectiveness. 
B. Mutual Recognition Between the FDA and the EMEA 
A more sweeping reform would involve the development of a qual-
ified mutual recognition system between the FDA and the EMEA. 
This system might work as follows. 61 Drug companies would be re-
quired to file application papers with both agencies. Upon approval of 
a new prescription drug by the EMEA, 62 the FDA would have a cer-
tain period - perhaps 180 days - in which to object to the market-
ing of that compound in the United States. If the FDA did not 
respond within the statutory time period, the new drug would auto-
matically gain approval for the U.S. market; if the FDA did object, 
the agency would bear the statutory burden of proving legitimate 
doubts about a new drug's safety or efficacy. 
Such a cooperative international approach to drug regulation seems 
to be at odds with the FDA's mandate and practice for most of this 
59 See TEMIN, supra note 16, at 12 2-23. 
60 A fully capitated provider that prescribes ineffective drugs bears two distinct types of costs 
- the cost of the drug itself and the indirect treatment costs of patients who do not become well. 
61 Some of these elements parallel the mutual recognition system in place among EC nations. 
However, unlike that system, in which decisions to prevent marketing of a drug that has been 
approved in other countries are subject to review by an EC-wide body, the FDA would have the 
right to refuse approval if it could prove doubts about safety. 
62 The system I propose would be mutual, in that the EMEA would also have to rule quickly 
on an application after a drug was approved by the FDA. For the sake of clarity in this discus-
sion, I will use the example of the FDA responding to an EMEA approval. 
I , I 
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century. The FDA has traditionally been regarded as the world's most 
influential pharmaceutical regulatory body63 and has thus been able 
essentially to dictate scientific standards and clinical requirements to 
drug manufacturers the world over. The profit potential from the 
American market has induced international manufacturers to comply 
with the FDA's high regulatory barriers. 
With the advent of an operative EMEA, however, the FDA no 
longer oversees the world's largest integrated pharmaceutical market. 64 
The nations of the European Community account for one third of the 
world market in pharmaceuticals; in 1988 this market was worth $38 
billion. 65 The existence of this huge integrated market threatens to un-
dermine the FDA's position of regulatory leadership, and U.S. patients 
ultimately may suffer from an even greater "drug lag" if pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers tailor their clinical research and new drug applica-
tions to satisfy EMEA standards. 
The FDA itself has recently taken steps toward international har-
monization of some of its requirements. A 1985 agency regulation al-
lows the use of certain approved studies from abroad. 66 In recent 
years, the agency has approved at least five NDAs based on foreign 
data alone, and nine based upon a mixture of foreign and domestic 
clinical trials. 67 
Moreover, the United States, Japan, and the EC have been work-
ing to harmonize their respective requirements for new drug research 
and applications. In November 1991, the three governments met at 
the first International Conference on the Harmonization of Technical 
Regulation. 68 This conference standardized technical issues of testing 
and evaluation and laid a framework for future collaboration. 69 More 
recently, the EMEA has stated that it will continue to explore the de-
velopment of harmonization and mutual recognition programs with 
the United States and Japan. 70 
V. ANALYSIS AND PROBLEMS 
Any effort to develop a degree of harmonization and mutual recog-
nition with a foreign regulatory body like the EMEA is sure to face 
63 See Katz, supra note 57, at 5 78-79. 
64 See id. at 5 79. 
65 See Louis H. Orzack, Kenneth I. Kaitin & Louis Lasagna, Pharmaceutical Regulation in 
the European Community: Barriers to Single Market Integration , I 7 J. HEALTH PoL., PoL'Y & 
LAW 847, 848 (1992). 
66 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.r2o, 314 .106 (1994). 
67 See Katz, supra note 57, at 58r. 
68 See David W. Jordan, Note, International Regulatory Harmonization: A New Era in Pre-
scription Drug Approval, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L LAw 471, 492-93 (1992); Katz, supra note 57, 
at 580. 
69 See Jordan, supra note 68, at 492-95. 
70 See A Drug Tsar is Born, THE EcONOMIST, May 7, 1994, at 74· 
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significant cnt1osm. These critiques could take several forms - from 
structural constitutional difficulties with delegating decisionmaking au-
thority to a foreign government to more subjective concerns about 
safety risks to the American public. Many of these concerns can be 
mitigated by a careful structuring of mutual recognition procedures. 
A. The N ondelegation Dilemma 
For most students of administrative law, the constitutional doctrine 
of nondelegation exists as a historical footnote rather than as a con-
temporary check on administrative authority. Stated in its purest 
form, the nondelegation doctrine limits the ability of Congress to dele-
gate to statutorily created administrative agencies the legislative pow-
ers vested in it by Article I of the Constitution. 71 However, on only 
two occasions in this century has the Supreme Court invalidated, on 
Article I grounds, an act of Congress which delegated legislative au-
thority to the President or an administrative agency;7 2 both of those 
instances occurred in the early years of the New DeaP 3 
The Court has set limits on the ability of Congress to delegate au-
thority beyond the bounds of the federal government. For instance, in 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co. ,74 the Court invalidated a statute that al-
lowed a majority of miners and mine owners to agree on maximum 
hours and minimum wage rates that would be binding on all produ-
cers.75 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the 
issue of delegation to foreign powers, similar constitutional concerns 
would apply to any agreement that enabled the EMEA to bind the 
FDA to a particular decision. For example, some scholars have argued 
that Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, which authorizes the 
United Nations Security Council to execute an agreement whereby 
U.S. forces would serve under foreign command, might violate the 
71 "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States 
.... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § r. 
72 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935); Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935). 
73 Although the Court has not explicitly invoked the nondelegation doctrine to overturn an 
act of Congress, the doctrine may have some continuing vitality as a limiting principle on admin-
istrative authority. In one 1980 concurrence, then-Justice Rehnquist stated that "[w]e ought not to 
shy away from our judicial duty to invalidate unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority 
solely out of concern that we should thereby reinvigorate discredited constitutional doctrines of 
the pre-New Deal era." Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 
607, 686 (r98o) (Rehnquist, ]., concurring). 
74 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
75 The Court stated that "[t)his is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is 
not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private 
persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same busi-
ness." !d. at 3rr. In this respect a "delegation" to the EMEA, in the form of some limited mutual 
recognition procedure, would be distinguishable, because the EMEA's "interests" - a safe and 
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Commander m Chief Clause76 of the Constitution or Congress's Arti-
cle I power to declare war . 77 
Case law suggests that a system of mutual recognition with the 
ElVI EA would be constitutional so long as the FDA retained the final 
authority to object to, or "veto," particular new drugs. For example , 
federal circuit courts have upheld the Maloney Act,78 which authorizes 
private self-regulation of the securities industry, against challenges of 
unconstitutional delegation. 79 In so doing, the courts have emphasized 
that although the regulatory scheme permits substantial rulemaking 
and adjudicatory authority by private industry associations, the statute 
is constitutional because the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
final authority to approve or disapprove the actions of these private 
bodies on appeal. so 
Based on this analysis, at least two structures for greater mutual 
recognition between the FDA and the EMEA would likely pass consti-
tutional scrutiny. First, the FDA could itself decide to give deference 
to EMEA findings on many new drugs as a policy matter. In negotia-
tions with the EMEA, the FDA could agree to a course of cooperation 
without any legally binding agreement.81 Alternatively, Congress 
could statutorily define an appropriate evidentiary standard by which 
the FDA should assess EMEA determinations and could set an abbre-
viated statutory time frame for decisions on EMEA-approved drugs, 
so long as final power to reject a new drug remained with the FDA. 
B. Safety Concerns 
Critics of a liberalized mutual recognition program will likely as-
sert numerous pragmatic difficulties with such a system. The foremost 
of these relates to the safety dangers posed by a reduction of the 
FDA's current regulatory authority over new drugs. As three leading 
76 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. r. 
77 See Michael J. Glennon & Allison R. Hayward, Collective Security and the Constitution: 
Can the Commander in Chief Power Be Delegated to the United Nations ?, 82 GEo. L.J. 1573, 
1587-99 (1994). Glennon and Hayward argue that the initial issuance of an Article 43 agreement 
by the U.N. Security Council does not raise delegation problems, because the President has the 
power to exercise the United States's veto power as a permanent member of the Council. See id. 
at 1594. However, an unconstitutional infringement on the Commander in Chief power might 
occur subsequently, if U.S. troops are put under the command of a foreign leader and the Presi-
dent's power to recall American troops is constrained by the U.N. agreement. See id. 
78 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
79 See Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531, 
551 (1989). 
80 See id. at 551-53 (citing Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977) and R.H. 
Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 6go (zd Cir. 1952)). 
81 This course of action is similar to that employed by the United States in certain arms 
control contexts. See Glennon & Hayward, supra note 77, at r6oo. For example, such parallel 
policy declarations were used by the United States and the Soviet Union to extend the arms 
control provisions in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). 
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members of Congress wrote in response to Bush Administration pro-
posals for greater regulatory harmonization, "[t]he use of any prescrip-
tion drug entails a risk of life-threatening adverse reactions. These 
risks will be compounded if decisions about safety and efficacy are 
delegated to ... foreign governments."82 
Defenders of the FDA 's current practice cite studies that show the 
potential dangers of early approval of new drugs in Europe. A report 
released by Public Citizen claims that the FDA's stringent safety and 
efficacy requirements have saved many lives by preventing dangerous 
drugs from reaching the U.S. market.8 3 The report documented 56 
drugs that had been approved for marketing in one or more European 
nations and then later withdrawn after causing adverse reactions in 
patients. 84 
Given the FDA's generally positive record in protecting the public 
from pharmaceutical disasters, such safety concerns have validity. In-
deed, the dominant status of American and European pharmaceutical 
companies in the world market raises the specter of excessive industry 
influence over any mutual recognition scheme. The FDA or the 
EMEA could conceivably engage in a competitive "race to the bottom" 
of the regulatory pool in an effort to assuage industry lobbyists or give 
favorable treatment to domestic manufacturers. 
However, the assertion that swift approval of new drugs will cause 
some deaths or injuries is only half of the public health equation, be-
cause beneficial new drugs· also save lives and reduce suffering due to 
illness. Moreover, an increase in mutuality or reciprocity with the 
EMEA avoids many of the substantial safety concerns associated with 
the more radical devolution of regulatory authority to private groups. 85 
As a governmental agency, the EMEA would share with the FDA the 
fundamental regulatory goals of balancing public safety against the po-
tential therapeutic gains from new drugs. Furthermore, if the FDA 
were able to show legitimate doubts about a new drug's safety, it 
could avoid reciprocal approval of a drug already certified by the 
EMEA. 
C. Demography and Culture 
Other problems arise from cultural and demographic differences 
between the United States and the European Community. Certain 
medical evidence suggests that different racial and ethnic groups expe-
rience different reactions to various pharmaceutical products, so that a 
82 Letter from Sen. Edward Kennedy and Reps. John Dingell and Henry Waxman to FDA 
Commissioner David Kessler (Nov. 13, 1991), cited in Jordan, supra note 68, at 502. 
83 See Study Says U.S. Has Better Barrier to Bad Drugs Than Europe, WASH. PosT, Feb. 3, 
1995, at A9 . 
84 See id . 
85 See supra p. 2015-16. 
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drug that is generally safe and effective in one population group might 
be less so in other racial or ethnic groups.86 Without proper rules gov-
erning the acceptance of European clinical trials, the FDA might find 
itself without adequate indicia of safety and effectiveness for the ethni-
cally and racially diverse American population. 
1\vo factors mitigate this problem, however. First, Europe itself is 
rapidly becoming more ethnically and racially diverse as a result of 
recent immigration. 87 Presumably the EMEA will of necessity take 
this increasing diversity into account before approving a drug for the 
entire EC market. Second, under the scheme proposed in this Note, 
the FDA would have an opportunity to reject a new drug already ap-
proved in Europe. If the FDA were convinced that the European data 
on a particular new drug is inadequate to assess properly that com-
pound's safety or effectiveness for all sectors of the U.S. population, 
the agency could deny recognition on that basis or require additional 
studies to assuage its concerns. 
Cultural differences also confound efforts at regulatory mutuality 
between Europe and the United States. Governmental regulation of 
drugs that have beneficial therapeutic potential involves a societal 
weighing of risk and benefit. To a large extent, societal attitudes to-
ward risk are culturally constructed, and they may vary widely be-
tween populations. 88 Because these societal attitudes are related to the 
particular social institutions and organization of a society,8 9 the differ-
ent historical development of public bodies in Europe and America 
may make problematic an interrelated drug regulatory scheme. 
There is some evidence to suggest that American attitudes about 
risk are different from those in other countries. A study by Sheila 
Jasanoff revealed variances between citizens of Britain and the United 
States in their attitudes toward four different types of environmental 
risk. 9o Jasanoff found that "[i]n Britain, scientists and governmental 
decision makers are certain to recognize a risk only when there is per-
suasive evidence of actual harm ... whereas in the United States a 
86 For instance, several studies have uncovered differences in the responses of blacks and 
whites to drugs designed to treat hypertension. See, e.g., Veterans Administration Cooperative 
Study Group on Antihypertensive Agents, Comparison of Propranolol and Hydrochlorothiazide for 
the Initial Treatment of Hypertension, 248(16) J.A.M.A. 1996, 2000 (1982) (finding that "blacks 
were more likely to respond to hydrochlorothiazide than propranolol," but finding that whites 
responded similarly to both drugs). 
87 See John Pomfret, Europe's "Rio Grande" Floods with Refugees: Rich Nations Becoming 
Inundated By Millions Fleeing War, Poverty, WASH. PosT, July 11, 1993, at A1. 
88 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RisK REGULATION 33-39 (1993) (describing the inconsistent and often irrational perceptions of 
risk held by the American public). 
89 See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE 9 (1982). 
90 See Sheila Jasanoff, Cultural Aspects of Risk Assessment in Britain and the United States , 
in THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF RISK 359, 385 (Branden B. Johnson and Vin-
cent T. Covello eds., 1987). 
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risk may also be acknowledged where there is no direct proof of injury 
to the public."91 This cultural diversity of attitudes may be com-
pounded in the realm of personal illness - especially terminal disease 
- where the very notion of "risk" becomes indeterminate and subjec-
tive. Finally, more identifiable cultural differences between the United 
States and the EC might arise with respect to moral attitudes about 
certain drug products, such as the European "abortion" drug RU-486 9 2 
or pharmaceuticals developed from the use of fetal tissue research or 
particularly intensive animal testing. 
Concerns about different European and American attitudes toward 
risk, safety, and morality are relevant to any movement toward har-
monization in drug regulation. However, like the demographic differ-
ences described above, such variances need not doom the entire 
scheme. The FDA and the EMEA would need to reach a general 
level of agreement on acceptable risk levels, but in particular instances 
of discord, the FDA would retain the final authority to show why it 
did not approve a particular new drug which passed EMEA scrutiny. 
V. CONCLUSIO N 
The firestorm of attention directed at the FDA 's drug approval 
process in recent months strongly suggests that some change will take 
place in the agency's procedures. Whether these reforms will be truly 
effective or will instead be mere window-dressing remains to be seen, 
and largely depends on policymakers' willingness to consider innova-
tive and substantial proposals for reform. In this regard, radical de-
regulation that would eliminate the FDA's pre-marketing approval 
authority over new drugs goes too far. Instead, a healthy dose of regu-
latory cooperation and competition with its new counterpart, the Euro-
pean Medicines Evaluation Agency, may be the best possible solution 
for the FDA. 
91 !d. 
92 For a general description of the controversy surrounding RU-486, see Carol Jouzaitis, Abor-
tion Pill Battle Surprise s French Firm , CHI. TRJB., Oct. r 7, 1994, at Cr. 
